How do the value o and the solution x and y of a zero-sum two-person completely mixed game vary as the elements of the n X n payoff matrix A = ( u,~) are perturbed?Assumingo>O,weshowthat,fori,j,k=l,...,n,O~dv/da,j=r,yl~1 (by a little-known theorem of Gross), that dx,/dajj = x,u+~~, dy,/da,j = y,o+,,, and (for g, h = 1,. . ., n) d"u/du,,, da,, = o[x,q,,+jr + xrqj+,,i] , where Glj is defined in terms of B = (b,j) = A-' by (pij = &,,b,,,)(&b,j) -b,,Z:,,,,,&,. If A is a nonsingular M-matrix, then for i, j = 1,. , n we have d"v/day, < 0, dr,/da,j -C 0, and dy,/da,, < 0, but v is not concave as a function of the vector of diagonal elements
INTRODUCTION
The value v(A) of an m x n real matrix A, 1 < m, n < co, is defined [IS] by v(A) = max min xTAy, x E p,,, Y E pn where T denotes transpose and P,,={x~R":x~>,0, i=l,2,...,n, and Cr,rx, = l}. A pair (x, y) , where x E P,,, and y E P,,, is a solution of A if
(Ay), < v(A) =s (x?'A)~
for i=l,..., m and j= l,..., n. These concepts arise in the theory of two-person zero-sum games (e.g. [4] ).
How do the value v(A) and solutions depend on the elements of A? It is known that if J is the m X n matrix with all elements equal to 1, then v( A + a./) = v(A) + a for a E R. The solutions of A + uJ are identical to those of A. Shapley [ll] proved that if A and B are m x n real matrices, LINEAR ALGEBRA AND ITS APPLICATIONS 79: 153-162 (1986) 153 then ]u(A) -u(B)] < maxi, jlai. , l. Gross [6] showed that if X X Y is the set of all sohrtions (x, y) of A, t h en the right and left derivatives of u(A) as a function of a single element a i i of A exist and are given by
He observed that when A has a unique solution, then the derivatives all exist (i.e., the left and right derivatives are equal) and I&, j dv/daij = 1.
Since Bohnenblust, Karlin, and Shapley [2, p. 561 proved that the set of m x n matrices A which have unique solutions is open and everywhere dense in mn-space, Gross's result implies that the derivatives exist for most A. Raghavan [9, p. 371 showed that if A is n X n and real, then for a E R, v( A + al ) is a continuous nondecreasing function of a, and v( A + al) -j F cc as a + _t co. Beyond these few facts, little appears to be known, and even Gross's results, which were never submitted for external publication, do not appear to be widely known.
The derivatives of the value as a function of matrix elements are of applied interest. For an observer of a game in which the matrix elements are estimated from data, the first derivatives indicate the sensitivity of the estimated value to errors in the estimated matrix, and therefore indicate which matrix elements should be estimated with greatest precision. For players attempting to manipulate or influence the matrix of a game in which they are involved, the first derivatives identify the matrix elements that would yield the largest rewards per unit of change, while the second derivatives identify where efforts to change a matrix element would yield (locally) increasing or decreasing returns in the value per unit of change in the matrix element.
Because of the similarity between the value of A and a formula [l]
xry for the spectral radius of an n X n matrix A = (ai j) with all a, > 0, where P,' = {xEPn:xi>O, i=1,2 )...) n }, one might hope for a qu ai. . native similarity between the behavior of v(A) and p(A) when A is square and A > 0 (meaning that all aij > 0).
In fact, the behavior of u(A) and p(A) can be dramatically different. For example, let a > 0.
Since p(A) > maxiaii, p(A(a))t CCJ as a t 00. On the other hand, using the procedure of Shapley and Snow [12] , it requires only elementary calculation to show that u( A(a)) = 1, regardless of a, with solution rr = ( f ,O, i), y* = (0, I, 0) .
Unlike the spectral radius, which is an analytic function of matrix elements, the derivative dv/daij of the value u = u(A) as a function of the element aij, holding all other elements constant, can fail to exist at a finite number of values of ai j. For example, if a E R, then has saddlepoints equal to 0, a, or 1, according as a < 0, 0 < a < 1, or 1~ a. Thus dv/da 11 = 0 for a < 0 and a > 1, and dv/da,, = 1 for 0 < a -C 1, but dv/da,, fails to exist for a = 0 and a = 1. This example also shows that v need not be concave or convex in general.
GENERAL RESULTS
The matrix A is defined to be comiletely mixed if, for every solution (x, y), no element of x is zero and no element of y is zero. If A is completely mixed, then the solution of A is unique and m = n [7] .
In the rest of this section, we shall suppose that u(A) > 0. Under this assumption, if A is completely mixed, then A is nonsingular [7] .
The first theorem, discovered independently of Gross [6] , is an immediate consequence of his results and the fact that a completely mixed matrix has a unique solution. We give an elementary proof, independent of Gross's, that introduces facts useful later. THEOREM 1. If A is completely mixed, then, for every i, j, &/da i j exists and equals xiyi, 0 -C dv/daij < 1, and Ci,jdv/daij = 1.
Proof.
Under the hypotheses, Kaplansky [7] and Shapley and Snow [12] showed that v(A) = l/lTAP'l,
where 1 is the n-vector with each element 1. The existence of dv/duij is immediate from (2.1) and the existence of d(A-')/daij.
From (2.2) where E i j is the n X n matrix with i, j element 1 and all others 0. This implies 0 < dv/du i j < 1 and Xi, j dv/du i j = 1. H Define, for any nonsingular n X n real matrix A with inverse A -' = B = (bjj), for 1 < j, k < n, THEOREM 2. Let A be completely mixed. Then for i, j, k = 1,. . . , The derivation of dy, /da i j is similar. 
. <i,<n
and l<j,<j,< **. <j,<n, we let A[i, ,..., i,]j, ,..., j,] denote the p x p submatrix of the n X n matrix A formed from the intersection of rows i, ,..., i, and columns jr,..., j,. We let A(i, ,..., i,ljl ,..., j,) denote the (n -p) X (n -p) submatrix of A that remains after striking out rows il,...,i, and columns ji,. . . , jr,, provided p -C n, while we define A(1 ,..., nil ,..., n) =l. A(k, hlj,g) 
THEOREM 4. Let
Canceling the terms common to Cg= ib,,Cz, rbjh and bjkXg, ,>hgll in the definition of +jk( A) gives (2.6). Collecting terms in (2.6) with common indices of summation gives (2.7). Specializing a formula found in, e.g., [S, 1: 21, (33) ], det B[i, ,..., i,]j, ,..., j,] = (d&A)-'( -l)Xi'+X:i'detA(j, ,..., jP]i, ,..., iP), (2.9) to the summands on the right of (2.7) gives (2.8). If A is singular, s-pM = 0, so xTA = OT and Ay =O, where 0 is the n-vector with each'element 0. Therefore (x, y) is a solution of A, and A has value 0.
If A is nonsingular, then s > pM, so B = (bij) = A-' >, 0 (e.g. [5, 2:66]). Moreover, S = Xi, jbi j > 0, since otherwise B would be singular. Theorem 1 of Raghavan [lo] , rediscovered as Corollary 5 of [3] , asserts that if A is a nonsingular matrix with A-' > 0, then v(A) = S-i, so o > 0. w THEOREM 6. Let A be an n X n nonsingular M-matrix. Then for i, j =
Proof.
By Theorems 2 and 3, (3.1), (3.2) and (3.3) are equivalent to &i(A) < 0 for i = l,..., n, since x > 0, y > 0, and v(A) > 0. It entails no loss in generality, and is notationally convenient, to relabel the rows and columns of A in the same way so that i = 1. By Theorem 4, (2.8) @ii= -(detA)-' 5 5 ( -l)g+hdetA(l,h]l,g). To see that the answer can be no, let A = Z -M be the 3 X 3 matrix in the next to last paragraph with m = 100 (i.e., aii = 1, i = 1,2,3; aI2 = -100; and all other elements of A are 0). Let D be the 3 X 3 diagonal matrix with diagonal elements d 11 = 2, d,, = 1, and d, = 0 . It is easy to see that A, A + D, and A + 20 are all nonsingular M-matrices. It is not hard to show that u(A) = 6, u(A + D) = 5, and u(A +2D) = 2, from which it follows that 2u(A + D) < v(A)+ u(A +2D).
OPEN PROBLEM
For finite matrix games that are not completely mixed, find an efficient procedure for deciding when the derivatives of the value as a function of a given matrix element exist, and find formulas for computing those derivatives when they exist. Lloyd Shapley (personal communication, 11 October 1984) observed that the nonexistence of any derivatives as a function of a given matrix element should turn up as degeneracies in the linear-programming solution of the game. As quoted in Section 1, Gross [6] gave formulas for the first derivative of the value in the general case, but these formulas have not been extended yet to higher derivatives of the value or to derivatives of the solutions. 
